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Abstract. This article investigates the consequences of the production of table 
grapes for export to corporate supermarkets in the global North on labor in a re-
gion of the Brazilian North-east. This production is destined to meet the growing 
demand for year-round food marketed as quality food. Quality food is required 
by supermarket chains to increase competitiveness and is guaranteed through 
third-party certification programs. Despite claims that certification not only main-
tains product quality but also safeguards the use of labor, the study demonstrates 
that the global production of quality grapes engenders negative consequences 
for workers. Laborers work longer for less pay, perform more sophisticated tasks, 
are employed mostly through temporary contracts, and experience new and more 
advanced forms of control. Additionally, the article illustrates the ways in which 
other salient actors, such as global food retailers, brokers and firms, operate in 
regard to labor and quality grape production. It is concluded that, despite various 
claims about the objectives of certification programs, the actual use of the certifi-
cation processes at the local level does not translate immediately into better labor 
relations in the global South.
Introduction
The effect that globalization has on social relations has been one of the most fre-
quently studied topics in recent sociological scholarship (e.g. Harvey, 1989, 2006; 
Dicken, 1998; Robinson, 2004; Bonanno and Cavalcanti, 2011). In particular, concepts 
such as hypermobility of capital – the enhanced velocity with which various forms 
of capital (i.e. financial, productive, commercial) move about the globe – and global 
sourcing – the corporate search of convenient factors and conditions of production 
– have been employed to illustrate new and often more exploitative social relations 
(Harvey, 2005; Sassen, 2007; Reich, 2008). These concepts have also been employed 
in the study of agriculture and food to analyze the manner in which the existence 
and working of agri-food commodity chains link distant actors in consumption and 
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production networks (e.g. Bonanno et al., 1994; Heffernan and Constance, 1994; Hef-
fernan, 2000; Moreira, 2001, 2004; McMichael, 2002; Prichard and Burch, 2003; Busch 
and Bain, 2004; Friedland, 2004; Marsden and Murdoch, 2006; Burch and Lawrence, 
2007).
Pertinent literature has further shown the importance of consumption as a form of 
resistance to corporate power and the manner through which the demand for ‘qual-
ity’ food has been employed to develop alternative and more democratic food net-
works (Humphery, 1998; Lockie, 2002; Marsden, 2003; Busch and Bain, 2004; Burch 
and Lawrence, 2005, 2007; Bonanno and Constance, 2008; Wright and Middendorf, 
2008; Bonanno, 2010). Also documented are on-going corporate efforts to capture 
this demand and transform it into an instrument to enhance the power of global su-
permarket chains (Gabriel and Lang, 1995; Gereffi et al., 2001; Marsden, 2003; Burch 
and Lawrence, 2005; Bonanno and Constance, 2008; Hendrickson et al., 2008). It has 
been shown that corporate retailers employ the notion of ‘quality food items’ to 
enhance their competitiveness in, and control of, increasingly concentrated main-
stream markets (Moreira, 2001; Marsden, 2003; Busch and Bain, 2004; Burch and 
Lawrence, 2005, 2007; Konefal et al., 2005; Seyfang, 2006; Lawrence and Burch, 2007; 
Wright and Middendorf, 2008; Bain, 2010a; Bain and Hatanaka, 2010). Despite the 
wealth of research on the demand for quality food, relatively less attention has been 
paid to the intersection of corporate production, global mass consumption of quality 
food items, and labor. In particular, only limited emphasis has been placed on the 
ways in which the production of corporate quality food affects the use of labor. This 
article addresses this gap by illustrating the consequences of quality fruit production 
in a region of the global South on wage-labor. Specifically, the article investigates the 
consequences of the production of table grapes for export to corporate supermarkets 
in the global North on labor in a region of the Brazilian North-east. Attention is paid 
to the use of third-party certification programs (TPCPs) as mechanisms to define 
quality and instruments employed by relevant actors to shape the use of local labor.
 The article opens with a review of pertinent literature. Key arguments on 
the outcomes of globalization of agri-food on food production and consumption and 
labor are reviewed along with salient contributions on third-party certification. The 
central segment of the article is occupied by the illustration of the case-study. The 
development and characteristics of grape production for export in the San Francisco 
Valley in North-eastern Brazil are illustrated. This segment also reviews the meth-
odology employed in the study. The concluding part links the findings to relevant 
literature.
Globalization and Agri-food Production, Consumption and Third-party 
Certification
In recent years, the topic of globalization has received significant scientific attention 
in the social sciences in general (e.g. Cavanagh and Mander, 2004; Robinson, 2004; 
Flanagan, 2006; Harvey, 2006; Sassen, 2007) and in the sociology of agriculture and 
food in particular (e.g. Bonanno et al., 1994; McMichael, 1994; Prichard and Burch, 
2003; Bonanno and Constance, 2008; Wright and Middendorf, 2008). One of the com-
mon traits of this literature is the emphasis on the processes of the compression 
of space and acceleration of time and their effects on production and consumption 
(Harvey, 1989, 2000, 2006; Dicken, 1998; Bonanno and Cavalcanti, 2011). The com-
pression of space refers to the reorganization of production and consumption based 
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on social relations that unfold over a space that is physically greater but socially 
smaller than in the past (Bonanno and Constance, 2008). For instance, large global 
food retailers in Europe control farm practices in Latin America with greater effec-
tiveness and without direct intervention or ownership (Marsden et al., 1996; Bo-
nanno and Cavalcanti, 2011). Simultaneously, consumers in the affluent North can 
count on the availability of food items in a manner that transcends traditional sea-
sonal and/or socio-geographic limitations (Marsden, 2003; Wright and Middendorf, 
2008). The acceleration of time refers to the speeding up of the social time necessary 
for the production and consumption of commodities. Barriers to the faster repro-
duction and circulation of commodities have been significantly reduced through a 
variety of practices at the technological, political, economic and social levels. For 
instance, fruits and vegetables are grown using genetically improved varieties that 
develop faster, are pest resistant and much less susceptible to production delays 
caused by weather conditions. They are packed directly in the field in containers 
that maintain their ‘freshness’ and extend their commercial lives. Finally, they are 
shipped to points of consumption benefiting from fewer trade restrictions and faster 
carriers than in the past (Bonanno and Constance, 2008).
The consequences of the creation of global networks of production and consump-
tion associated with globalization have been interpreted in a variety of ways. Globali-
zation advocates view them as beneficial to society. Some of the most sophisticated 
of these analyses recognize that global social relations entail some undesirable social 
and economic consequences, yet this is an acceptable price that society should be 
willing to pay in order to enjoy the much greater benefits that they generate (Fried-
man, 2000, 2006; Kitching, 2001). Critics, however, identify globalization as one of 
the most efficient tools to control labor, advance the class project of ruling elites, and 
role back many of the gains obtained by subordinate classes in previous decades 
(Dicken, 1998; Sklair, 2001; Robinson, 2004; Harvey, 2005, 2006; Sassen, 2007).
The negative effects of globalization on labor have been stressed by some of the 
works in the sociology of agri-food. Heffernan and his associates (Heffernan and 
Constance, 1994; Heffernan, 2000; Hendrickson et al., 2008) demonstrated the ability 
of transnational corporations not only to diminish the power of agri-food workers 
but also to effectively control them through capital mobility. Corporations’ ability 
to relocate plants and/or threaten relocation has been a formidable tool to obtain 
concessions from labor and local communities. Similarly, Friedland contends that 
the corporate strategy to establish global agri-food commodity chains has enhanced 
control over labor (Friedland, 1994, 2004). Studying the same geographical area dis-
cussed in this article, Collins (1993, 2000) points out that the creation of global net-
works for the production and consumption of fruits and vegetables increases the 
exploitation of labor. Her work documents the increase in exploitative forms of labor 
relations based on labor flexibility, the use of weaker segments of the labor force 
(women and children) and subcontracting. She indicates that firms use weaker and 
flexible segments of the labor force when their primary objective is to reduce costs. 
In situations when quality and timing of production are more relevant, subcontract-
ing emerges as the preferred strategy.1
The diminished power of labor under globalization has been employed to argue 
that resistance has been shifted to the consumption level. Research indicates that 
reflexive consumers searching for quality food products can be effective progres-
sive actors (Gabriel and Lang, 1995; Humphery, 1998; DuPuis, 2000; Lockie, 2009). 
Combining the quest for quality with the importance of the local, consumers have 
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been instrumental in opening up new democratic spaces, such as civic agriculture, 
organic and/or natural production and farmers markets (Collins, 2000; Goodman, 
2000; Raynolds, 2000; Lyson, 2004; Hinrichs et al., 2004). It has been recognized, 
however, that global corporate retailers employed food quality as a tool to further 
their interests (Busch and Bain, 2004; Burch and Lawrence, 2005, 2007; Bain, 2010a; 
Bonanno and Cavalcanti, 2011). The literature has demonstrated the growing power 
of global corporate retailers and their ability to affect production and consumption 
networks. A number of authors have pointed out that by shifting emphasis to qual-
ity and desirability, corporate retailers control distant production processes and la-
bor in unprecedented ways (Marsden and Arce, 1995; Marsden, 2003; Morgan et al., 
2006; Busch and Bain, 2004; Campbell, 2004; Burch and Lawrence, 2007; Campbell 
and Le Heron, 2007; Campbell and Dixon, 2009). As competition shifted away from 
price and became centered increasingly on convenience and product differentiation, 
corporate supermarkets began to attract consumers by emphasizing the quality and 
uniqueness of their food products (Busch and Bain, 2004; Burch and Lawrence, 2005, 
2007; Bain, 2010a; Bain and Hatanaka, 2010).
Corporate retailers’ use of third-party certification programs has been a funda-
mental instrument in their attempt to co-opt progressive consumers’ demand. In 
particular, they employed TPCPs to demonstrate the quality of fresh fruits and veg-
etables sold in their stores (Konefal et al., 2005; Lockie et al., 2006; Marsden and 
Murdoch, 2006; Bain, 2010a, 2010b; Bain and Hatanaka, 2010). TPCPs call for the 
verification that good production practices are employed in the production and de-
livery of food items. However, they also call for the establishment of standards in an 
array of related spheres such the environment, health, safety, and use of labor (Busch 
and Bain, 2004; Konefal et al., 2005; Bain, 2010a, 2010b; Bain and Hatanaka, 2010).
 While corporate retailers stress that TPCPs guarantee the quality and safety of 
food, the assumed positive results of their application do not always materialize 
(Busch and Bain, 2004; Konefal et al., 2005, 2007; Bain and Busch, 2006; Bain, 2010b; 
Bain and Hatanaka, 2010; Hatanaka, 2010a). Studies indicate that retailers’ expanded 
role in the implementation of TPCPs often hampers rather than promotes democratic 
governance; TPCPs use of scientific and technical measures hides political agendas 
that favour corporate actors; and certification penalizes weaker social groups (i.e. 
Hatanaka, 2006, 2010a, 2010b; Bain, 2010b; Bain and Hatanaka, 2010; Konefal and 
Busch, 2010).2 To be sure, these and other works also indicate the contested nature of 
TPCPs. Corporate retailers’ gains from, and control of, TPCPs are not necessarily as 
strong as often assumed while local actors’ empowerment and more transparency 
in production processes may indeed occur (Campbell and Le Heron, 2007; Bonanno 
and Constance, 2008; Bain, 2010a; Hatanaka, 2010a).
The impact of TPCPs on labor has been addressed only by a handful of stud-
ies. It has been observed that small and medium farmers and wage laborers have 
suffered negative consequences from the implementation of TPCPs (Hatanaka et 
al., 2005; Bain, 2010b; Hatanaka, 2010b). In the case of small and medium farmers, 
participation in TPCPs allows these producers access to affluent markets, but it also 
requires that they pay for the service. Inability to pay translates often into exclusion 
from these affluent markets and economic marginalization (Bain, 2010b; Hatanaka, 
2010b).
As far as wage-labor is concerned, it has been argued that the implementation of 
TPCPs forces growers to search for strategies to reduce costs. This situation, in turn, 
translates into labor exploitation (Bain, 2010b; Selwyn, 2010). As retailers pressure 
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growers to pay for certification, the latter compensate for the additional expenses 
by lowering labor costs. There has been a reduction of permanent positions and the 
concomitant increase in temporary workers (Bain, 2010b). Temporary workers are 
hired only during periods of high labor demand and released for the rest of the year. 
They tend to be paid less, work longer hours, offer less political resistance, and their 
employment does not require the payment of social benefits (Bain, 2010b; Selwyn, 
2010). Additionally, cost-cutting strategies involve subcontracting (see Bain, 2010b). 
Growers subcontract farm tasks to third-party agencies. As these agencies supply 
workers, they also become responsible for certification requirements relieving grow-
ers from these responsibilities (Bain, 2010b). Due to the often informal status of sub-
contractors, regulation is rarely followed (Bain, 2010b; Selwyn, 2010). Labor unions 
resist these exploitative strategies and have been active in denouncing the frequent 
law violations involved in subcontracting and the use of temporary labor (Bain, 
2010b; Selwyn, 2010). The case presented in this study addresses the above-men-
tioned literature by exploring the consequences that global supermarkets’ required 
third-parry certification of table grape production has on wage labor.
The Case
Methodology
This article employs a case-study methodology. Data were collected through un-
obtrusive observations, in-depth interviews with key actors, and consultation of 
existing documents. Key actors include permanent and temporary wage-workers, 
managers of corporate farms, producers (farmers) who operate their own farms, pro-
duction co-operatives and union representatives. Interviews and observations were 
carried out throughout 2008 and during the first three months of 2009. Additional 
pertinent information was collected during site visits conducted in previous years. 
Interviews and observations were transcribed and analyzed employing the qualita-
tive method of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; More et al., 2009). The analysis of 
the text permitted the development of analytical categories that were employed to 
interpret the data. These categories were validated through the techniques of satura-
tion and negative cases (Charmaz, 2006). Interviews were conducted in Portuguese 
and the direct quotes that appear below were translated into English for this article. 
The central theoretical concept of food quality has been operationalized in terms of 
the implementation of the requirements associated with the GLOBALG.A.P. certifi-
cation process (GLOBALGAP, 2009).
Brief History and Characteristics of the Region
The region studied is the San Francisco Valley in the interior of the North-eastern 
portion of Brazil. Known locally with the name of Sertão, this region lies around the 
cities of Petrolina and Juazeiro. It is a semi-arid region historically associated with 
drought, poverty and immigration. To stimulate socio-economic development, in 
the 1960s the Brazilian government invested to channel the waters of the San Fran-
cisco river for the production of hydro-electric energy and land irrigation projects. 
Conceived in term of a two-phase developmental scheme, the land irrigation project 
was designed to create farms for the production of fruits and vegetables. In the first 
phase, this production was destined to supply domestic agro-industries. In the sec-
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ond, it was mostly directed for export to more affluent markets in the global North. 
Implemented in the 1980s, this second phase coincided with the growth of global 
agri-food networks (Cavalcanti, 1999).
In the late 1960s, about 70 000 hectares of irrigated land were used for production 
as new farms were established. By 2007, about 100 000 hectares of irrigated land were 
employed in the production of primarily mangoes and grapes,3 but also coconuts 
and bananas (Valexport, 2007). The farms that were created varied in size and type 
of ownership/control (see Table 1 for a summary view). The largest amount of land 
is currently controlled by a small group of large farms. In the case of grape produc-
tion, large farms constitute 5.7% of all farms and occupy 46% of the cultivated land. 
These farms are controlled by a combination of domestic but mostly international 
commercial corporations. Global supermarket chains, such as Carrefour, Tesco and 
Wall-Mart – that operates through its Brazilian subsidiary Bom Preço – are present 
through direct ownership of farms along with some Brazilian companies that also 
invested in the purchase of large operations.
Medium farms occupy about 24% of all cultivated land and account for almost 
15% of all farms. They are owned by local exporting firms controlled by Brazilian 
professionals with a variety of backgrounds, such as lawyers, physicians, teachers, 
agronomist, retailers, and others. Most have been in agricultural production for 
generations while others only recently redirected their investments from other eco-
nomic sectors. Small farmers or colonos operate about 80% of all farms and 30% of 
cultivated land. Differing from large and medium farms, they rely significantly on 
family labor but also employ wage workers for about 40% of all labor output (Cor-
reia and Marinozzi, 1999). There are varying estimates of the number of wage labor-
ers employed in grape production in the area with consensus placing this number at 
about 20 000 in the mid-1990s (Bloch, 1996, p. 49). Due to the economic crisis of the 
late 2000s, it has not grown as rapidly in recent years (Cavalcanti et al., 2011). While 
some wage-workers come from the metropolitan areas of Petrolina and Juazeiro, a 
much greater number are migrants who come from adjacent states and poorer and 
less unionized areas. The recruitment of migrant labor has been employed by firms 
to count on a more docile labor force (Cavalcanti et al., 2011). Small producers sell 
their products to co-operatives and/or firms creating a hierarchy in the production 
process led by brokers. Brokers establish deals with supermarket chairs and export-
ing firms and co-operatives.
In the late 1960s, the irrigated land was first employed to grow tomatoes and 
onions. The rapid success of these crops gave impetus to the further expansion of 
cultivated land and production. However, the decades that followed saw a number 
of ‘growth and bust’ cycles that severely limited the original enthusiasm of local 
producers (Cavalcanti, 1999). The introduction of mangos but above all table grapes 






Type of labor used Ownership
More than 50 5.7 46 wage-labor mostly global corporate and 
some domestic corporate
10 – 49.9 15.0 24 wage-labor domestic investors (export 
firms)
Less then 10 79.3 30 family and wage-
labor
colonos (local farmers)
Table 1. Structural characteristics of table grape farms in the San Francisco Valley.
Source: Elaboration on secondary data.
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in the late 1980s provided renewed momentum to production and allowed the de-
velopment of a steady flow of commodities toward supermarket chains in the global 
North.
Currently, the San Francisco Valley is the primary fruit producing region in Brazil. 
The production of fruits has steady grown over the last two decades and accounts 
for about 40% of all agricultural exports of the country (Fachinello et al., 2011). As 
far as the production of grapes is concerned, it has grown from less then one million 
metric tons to over 1.5 million between 2000 and 2010 representing 18% of all fruits 
produced and 13% of all fruits exported. Additionally, the land cultivated and the 
value of the crop exported increased by 39% and 200% respectively during the same 
period (Fachinello et al., 2011). The development of counter-seasonal contracts con-
tributed to the growth of demand and employment. In the San Francisco Valley, the 
demand for labor is consistent and represents a source of jobs for workers. As it will 
be illustrated below, this demand, however, is accompanied by changes in the use of 
labor that temper some of the gains associated with job availability.
The growth of the sector involves the presence of new actors. Among these new 
actors trade brokers play a significant role. Born as middlemen between producers 
and global supermarket chains, brokers quickly assumed the concomitant roles of 
informal guarantors of the ‘quality’ required by retailers and enforcers of new pro-
duction practices at the local level. They brought to the local producers the norms 
and conditions of production stemming from global retailers’ industrial plans. They 
also are the agents that establish the business contracts through which producers 
are able to sell their grapes. Brokers are the gate-keepers that allow production to be 
channeled to global supermarket chains.
Producers learned quickly that they had to follow brokers’ instructions and re-
quirements if they wished to have their crops included in global production net-
works. Producers began to feel the subordination to brokers and their organizational 
power. Currently, while producers constantly refer to the ‘open market’, there is an 
understanding that brokers are the actors who make this abstract market a reality. 
More specifically, it is through the role performed by the brokers that the conditions 
and required tasks of production are defined for producers.
Brokers also ask growers to pay for certification and they comply with this re-
quest. A medium-size grower comments:
‘They [brokers] go everywhere and can get you everywhere. You need to 
stay with them and do as they say even when they ask you to pay for certi-
fication. We don’t know to whom they deal with and how. But they make it 
possible to sell… if you want to sell in this world market, you need to stay 
with them. They maintain a good relation with producers.’
Simultaneously, while brokers are instrumental in the enforcement of quality re-
quirements, they shield global retailers from direct interaction with local actors. This 
is relevant in the process of control of local labor relations as supermarket chains 
– the primary actors responsible for the establishment of contracts and certification 
– are not seen by producers and workers alike as those in control of the overall pro-
duction process. Local producers and workers view brokers as the primary force in 
the organization of production. Ultimately, brokers provide a social buffer between 
supermarket chains and producers that depersonalizes production requirements 
and makes them abstract and disconnected from their sources. Brokers, therefore, 
contribute to the reification (Lukács, 1968) of the production process whereby the 
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social relations that engendered it are largely invisible to those who work in the 
fields. As clearly illustrated by classical sociological theory, the reified understand-
ing of social relations is one of the primary tools for the control and subordination 
of labor. A grower states:
‘Everything [in the production process] is well organized in advance by brokers. 
Tasks are given to each producer and nobody knows why we need to do it nor what 
the others are asked to do or did. We are told of the ships, the trucks, the containers, 
the boxes, etc., that we need to use in production. Then we have to pay attention to 
everything from the schedule of ships, to the freight prices, the port services, and 
who are the transportation carriers for our containers. We need to make sure that all 
the required production steps are followed. We are told all this ahead of time, one or 
two months before the shipment has to go out.’
Despite their unclear origins, instructions are accepted. They are also rarely ques-
tioned even when they make little sense to those in the fields. Rule acceptance is so 
strong that it becomes a challenge but also a source of pride when requirements are 
met. Another producer says:
‘A group of 35 people came to view our products. They were German, 
Dutch, and Japanese buyers and visited some of the local farms. They come 
at the end of the harvest to present awards to those who met the require-
ments. We could do it and do it well.’
Corporate Quality Food and Labor
Some the most relevant consequences of global retailers’ requirements for the pro-
duction of certified quality food are changes in the use of labor. Salient among these 
are: production time, working time, labor remuneration, employment conditions, 
and labor control.4 In the following pages an analysis of the manner in which these 
processes are affected by the demand for certified quality food is presented.
Production Time
That the time employed in the production of agricultural commodities is socially 
constructed is not a new finding. In their classical analyses, both Marx and Weber, 
among others, point out the socially constructed nature of work. Marx, for instance, 
discusses at length the manner in which changes in productivity shorten the socially 
necessary time for the reproduction of labor. Identifying this process as the rela-
tive exploitation of labor, he contends that the introduction of technical innovations 
makes the time necessary to produce a given amount of value shorter than in the 
past (Marx, 1977, pp. 533–565). Furthermore, and speaking of farm labor, he distin-
guishes between ‘working time’ and ‘production time’ (Marx, 1992, pp. 316–325). 
Working time is defined as the time in which labor transform factors of produc-
tion into commodities. Production time, conversely, refers to the ‘entire time… of 
the production process’ (Marx, 1992, p. 316) and includes times in which factors of 
production are idle due to some barriers such as snow covered fields in the winter. 
The time necessary to generate a commodity ‘can be often shortened to a greater or 
less extent by the artificial shortening of the production time’ (Marx, 1992, p. 317). 
For Weber the acceleration of production time is associated with the rationalization 
of society (Weber, 1968, pp. 164–166). He contends that the use of formal rationality 
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in the organization of social institutions and relations along with the development 
of advanced systems of production, such as mechanization but also rational book-
keeping, created the conditions for a constant acceleration of work and production 
tasks (Weber, 1968, pp. 337–154). Affected by cultural traits, this acceleration of pro-
duction time is a constant feature of modern society (Weber, 1968). In more recent 
times, students of agriculture have also stressed the particular nature of capitalist 
farm production. In their now classical article, Mann and Dickinson (1978) employ 
Marx’s theory to discuss the natural barriers to capitalist production that allow the 
persistence of family farms in contemporary agriculture. However, these and other 
structuralist accounts of the organization of farm production (see also the coeval 
work of Mottura and Pugliese, 1975, 1980), fail to stress the social construction of 
agricultural production as they underscore its immanent component. For Mann and 
Dickinson the existence of natural barriers to agricultural production is a permanent 
dimension. For Marx, conversely, agricultural production under capitalism is con-
stantly accelerated and based on the class nature of its organization.
Current practices of agricultural production have exceeded many of the expecta-
tions of classical sociologists and this is certainly the case of global agri-food net-
works. To follow Marx, the ‘natural’ conditions for grape production in the San 
Francisco Valley would not entail any difference between working time and produc-
tion time as grapes can be grown year-round. However, the presence of powerful 
actors constructs the ‘times’ in which production is ‘possible’ in the Valley. Global 
retailers’ request for a year-round steady supply of grapes and competition from 
actors in other world locations (primarily California and Chile) contribute to the 
social construction of counter-seasonal markets and local market ‘windows’. These 
are the times in which there is an adequate demand for local production. And these 
are also the times in which production ought to be ready to be shipped to consump-
tion centers.
Currently in the San Francisco Valley, these socially constructed windows coin-
cide with two eight-week periods in May–June and November–December. These 
periods are the outcomes of a dynamic interaction process in which producers ac-
tively attempt to extend these windows and/or create new ones. They delay and/
or reschedule harvest times but are virtually impotent against corporations’ global 
sourcing. As a result, these constructed windows are now accepted by producers 
and workers alike. One producer states:
‘We can and wish to produce for additional periods during the year. But 
it has been very difficult, almost impossible, for us to sell grapes in other 
periods of the year. We learned when it is convenient for us to produce… 
this is the way it is… We need to take advantage of the available times to 
export and must increase productivity and reduce costs. This year, we can’t 
make mistakes; we must send good grapes to the market at the right time 
and export as much as we can.’
Working Time
The production tasks carried out by hired workers increased. Certification require-
ments used by GLOBALG.A.P. mandate new rules designed to establish the qual-
ity of the fruits. Producers execute these rules by assigning new tasks to workers. 
Accordingly, these rules translate into adding a number of facets to the production 
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process that increased hired laborers’ work-load. They cover the preparation of the 
fields, preharvest, harvest and post-harvest activities, including pruning, sorting, 
packaging, and shipping, but also require some expertise in management, account-
ability and traceability of the product. In essence, workers are now asked to perform 
multiple tasks generating a process of reskilling of labor. Moreover, laborers are now 
required to demonstrate that they can perform these various components of the job 
if they wish to be hired. A hired laborer indicates:
‘I need to make sure that all my tasks are done well. I need to pick the 
grapes, but also prune off those parts of the bunch that don’t look good. I 
need to place them in the box. If I pick seedless grapes I need to place them 
in the plastic bags. These are the bags that are shipped out.’
These new requirements further mandate additional training. However, training 
turns out to be specific to the firm, not remunerated, and almost invariably unre-
lated with higher wages. Contrary to established arguments that associate reskilling 
with better economic labor conditions and overall labor strength (e.g. Attewell, 1987; 
Reich, 2008), reskilling in fruit production is marked by increased labor exploita-
tion. Training is performed informally relying on the knowledge and skills of more 
experienced workers. Because each firm must conform to contractual specifications, 
workers are instructed to a new set of rules that often differ from the ones that they 
learned and applied in the past. A trainer (older worker) explains:
‘New workers will learn what is required and how things work here. They 
will know that this is a different place and, therefore, there are different 
rules. Then they will ask questions and we will give them a comprehensive 
explanation, then they have to work and follow the rules.’
This situation is highly consistent with the now classical Marxian analysis of labor 
reskilling proposed by Harry Braverman (1974). For Braverman, specialization is 
one of the instruments through which workers are controlled in contemporary capi-
talism. As labor performs more specific tasks, the ability of supervisors to control 
workers increases along with workers’ productivity. These are conditions that char-
acterize grape production in this area.
Labor Remuneration
Neither the trainers nor the trainees are paid during the time they teach and learn 
the required procedures. These are requirements that are passed on to hired labor 
as necessary conditions to obtain work and to trainers as a necessary condition to 
keep their jobs. Firm and co-operative managers as well as farm owners who em-
ploy hired labor explain that they have to follow this practice in an effort to meet the 
brokers’ requests and keep costs down. A local producer states: ‘cutting labor cost is 
what firms and family farmers must do to compete effectively’.
According to local union representatives, overabundant and poorly paid workers 
are available in the region. As a union representative explained and field observa-
tions and interviews with workers confirmed, a great number of the hired labor-
ers employed in the area are immigrants from rural areas in adjacent states. This is 
the result of an effort by local producers to keep wage cost down. Producers prefer 
not to hire workers from Petrolina and Juazeiro as they tend to be union members 
accustomed to higher wages and better working conditions. Additionally, efforts 
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have been carried out to replace permanent workers with temporary laborers. The 
reduction of permanent workers is an effective cost cutting strategy as firms are not 
required to pay fringe benefits to temporary workers.
A union representative explains:
‘This past December [2008] a large numbers of workers applied for unem-
ployment benefits. [These are reserved only to those who have been em-
ployed for more than five continuous months.] There was a great reduc-
tion of the numbers of permanent contracts. The [name omitted] firm, for 
instance, usually employs 2,200 temporary workers and 1,100 permanent 
workers. The number of permanent workers was reduced to 400. But, the 
quantity exported went up from 70 000 [metric] tons in 2007 to 80 000 tons 
in 2008.’
Also according to local union representatives that were interviewed, the Federal 
Government has been more concerned with shielding exporting firms from the eco-
nomic crisis than assisting workers. As a result firms’ managers have used the crisis 
as an excuse to get more assistance from the government, impose lower wages and 
cut employment.
Arguably the most noticeable change from past labor relations is the diffusion of 
remuneration based on piece work. Hired laborers are now paid by the number of 
bunches that they pick and/or the boxes of grapes that they pack rather than receiv-
ing hourly wages. Given the increased amount of tasks to be performed by each 
worker, this practice increases the work load without increasing the pay. A grower 
explains:
‘Every worker has to accomplish their task of picking and packing 700 
bunches of grapes a day. If they can do more, they would get some addi-
tional remuneration. It is in the neighborhood of 2 or 3 reais5 per day.’
Yet, this is such a small amount that workers are discouraged from taking additional 
work despite the need for employment in a unfavorable labor market.
A local union representative indicates:
‘During pruning in a regular working day, a male worker trims about 80 
vines and receives from 10 to 50 cents per extra plant. Others won’t even 
get that. However, those workers do not show interest in additional work 
as they find that the extra pay is too small and it doesn’t change their lives.’
A worker adds:
‘We have to piece work 700 bunches a day. However, as the shape of a bunch 
varies, so does the work to be performed. In some cases, it takes longer to 
finish a bunch. But the pay is the same unless we pick more bunches.’
In the case of seedless grapes, for instance, a longer work time is required yet remu-
neration remains the same.
A female worker explains:
‘Seedless grapes are smaller and more fragile. They are not very easy to 
pick as the bunches break and we need put them in plastic bags. It takes 
more work.’
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Firms have been able to convince workers to accept this new work load by arguing 
that seedless grapes have a shorter growing season and that new and time saving 
technology is available. It is assumed that less work is required.
A producer explains:
‘Seedless grapes have a short cycle. From the first trimming of the vines 
to harvest, it takes 100 days, whereas for the others it takes 120 days. At 
the beginning we thought that seedless grapes would require less work 
because of the shorter cycle. But as this is a feeble and fine fruit, harvesting 
is time consuming and it is not good for making up a bunch… In the case 
of other varieties, the fruit is harder and not so difficult to pick and have 
a good bunch. However, nowadays we use of a new technique of pruning 
that really cuts the amount of work needed.’
In the field, nevertheless, the story is told the other way around. A worker explains 
it clearly:
‘Picking seedless grapes requires a lot more work… and the new pruning 
requirements add lot more work also.’
Employment Conditions
Certification of food quality involves terms that prescribe not only the safeguarding 
of acceptable conditions of labor use but also the prevention of overt labor exploita-
tion (GLOBALGAP, 2009).6 However, these terms are understood and carried out 
according to their formal meaning. Substantively, the situation in the fields is quite 
different. Firm managers and producers have used the certification process as an in-
strument to ‘to cut the cost of labor’, as a union representative indicated. They have 
coupled it with the ‘need’ to address the global economic crisis to create a legitima-
tion strategy that has been used to restructure employment. The words of a firm 
manager capture this posture:
‘The crisis is severe. We need to do whatever we can to stay competitive… 
we need to receive more support from the government… we even burned 
and buried some crops to keep prices high… [because of this crisis] we are 
forced to cut down costs and this means to review labor cost. We need to 
reduce the volume of production, employment, and rework contracts to 
limit the number of permanent jobs in favor of temporary employment.’
Another manager says:
‘In any agribusiness, those who produce in a lean manner are the only ones 
who survive.’
A co-operative manager maintains:
‘We serve the most exigent markets in England and the United States… 
since we started the co-operative the aim has been to cut costs… and to 
focus on quality certification.’
Labor unions have documented the labor cost saving strategies used by firms and 
the lack of support that labor receives form the Brazilian government. According to 
unions the government has been concerned with supporting firms and paid only lip-
service to the interests of workers. A union representative explains:
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‘The Ministry of Labor does not pay attention to the impact of the crisis on 
workers… they create measures to protect firms and don’t do much to [pro-
tect] employment, wages, and benefit for workers… Firms are using the 
crisis and certification to get better financial deals and reduce labor costs.’
To be sure, the Brazilian government has expressed concerns about the economic 
situation. It remains committed to implement measures to assist firms. But it has 
also stressed that any economic recovery should not come at the expenses of work-
ers. In effect, the economic recovery should enhance employment and improve labor 
conditions. A representative of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor speaking to a local 
audience stated:
‘Measures to assist fruit production should create new opportunities for 
labor and create new jobs. The idea is to help firms in order to create em-
ployment. Jobs should not be eliminated.’
Despite these pronouncements, however, the overall lack of government presence 
in the region and the relative weakness of unions leave firms in control of the labor 
market. As indicated above, contracts have been restructured to favor temporary 
employment and workers have been fired.
A female laborer says:
‘Recently, I had a five month contract to work for a firm, and I expected to 
be hired on a permanent basis… Previously I had worked for six years for 
another firm. Now I have a contract for only one month.’
A union representative adds:
‘Firms fire permanent workers. This is where they can cut costs as quickly 
as possible. They said that the crisis has created employment instability in 
the region. The situation of labor does not show much of a sign of improve-
ment.’
Another union official explains:
‘In this area we have contracts from May to June and from November to 
December. Also harvest contracts from June to October do not give work-
ers the right to have unemployment benefits. Workers will usually have six 
idle months, no wages, no benefits.’
Labor Control
Local firms use the process of certification to enhance control over workers. Because 
certification requires the formal verification of the appropriate execution of labor 
tasks, workers are subjected to a greater degree of scrutiny than in the past. This 
scrutiny centers on the processes of ‘labor acknowledgment’ and ‘direction of labor 
activities’. As far as labor acknowledgment is concerned, under certification rules, 
the execution of assigned labor tasks is considered accomplished only when for-
mally recognized (acknowledged) by supervisors. While forms of field supervision 
existed in the past, workers’ supervision associated with certification is different at, 
at least, two levels. First, supervisors’ power to evaluate workers’ performances is 
reinforced and legitimized by the specific set of formal rules that are dictated by the 
certification process. Second and because of the above, workers feel disempowered 
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when interacting with supervisors. Supervisors are armed with a list of required 
tasks/levels of performance and review workers’ activities accordingly. Commonly 
known as ‘being on the checklist’,7 workers’ labor becomes formally recognized only 
if it appears on the list compiled by supervisors. ‘You need to be on the checklist’, a 
worker commented. Performed work tasks become as such in so much as they are 
recorded on the appropriate list. A worker explains:
‘We are doing our job everyday and we have to harvest a set number of 
bunches. Later, the field supervisor arrives to record the results. She does it. 
While I know how much I worked, I’m not sure how much I have actually 
worked until she records the number of bunches I harvested and packed. 
She tells us.’
Legitimized by the necessity to meet certification requirements, workers are now 
given more and increasingly specific directions on how to execute their labor tasks. 
To make sure that these directions are followed, workers remain under close watch 
during the entire day. This is a situation that stands in sharp contrast with previous 
local labor practices. In the past, workers were left relatively free to use their experi-
ence and accumulated knowledge to complete a task as they were only moderately 
supervised. As indicated above, there is a clear sense that ‘workers will learn what is 
required and how things work here’. Workers need to learn the new and more strin-
gent procedures associated with grape production. The knowledge that they accu-
mulated in the past – even in recent experiences with other firms – must be set aside.
Regularly, managers issue directives to standardize and codify behavior in the 
field. A worker recalls that, recently, women were asked to ‘stop talking’ with an-
other one when ‘picking grapes’. While talking – along with singing – has been 
a long-established practice as workers harvest, now it is deemed an ‘activity that 
would distract laborers from performing their work tasks well’ as a manager put 
it. That workers have been asked to limit verbal exchanges on the job is not a new 
requirement. It has been employed to increase productivity but also to limit resist-
ance to management and political mobilization (Yates, 1994; Le Blanc, 1999). Yet it 
constitutes a new and disliked dimension in the relatively ‘non-rationalized’ social 
context of the Brazilian grape fields.
A worker says:
‘We come from different towns and neighborhoods… we cannot get to 
know each other well during breaks or lunch. These are short and we are 
under pressure to go back to work and complete the assignments.’
Conclusions
This case-study can be employed to make four concluding points in regard to perti-
nent literature. First, the study shows that certification requirements generate pro-
duction processes in which laborers work longer for less pay, perform more sophisti-
cated tasks, are employed mostly through temporary contracts, and experience new 
and more advanced forms of control. Despite progressive claims associated with 
certification and certification agencies, the production of quality grapes is not by 
itself a vehicle that leads to the betterment of the conditions of labor. This case, there-
fore, supports the arguments of those segments of the literature that point out that 
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certification requirements do not translate into more equitable and just social rela-
tions and promote democracy. There is a gap between the stated objectives of qual-
ity certification programs and the actual conditions of labor. Furthermore, current 
literature suggests that certification empowers local actors and that this power may 
limit that of corporate retailers. This case-study, however, shows that certification 
does not alter established power hierarchies. Local firms and producers actively use 
certification to gain power over labor but remain subordinate to corporate retailers 
and brokers.
Second, the case confirms arguments that stress that transnational corporate re-
tailers are powerful actors that control local production. This case-study, however, 
adds to the literature by demonstrating that corporate retailers maintain control 
without a noticeable local presence. They remain politically ‘invisible’ to workers 
and unions. Workers remain unaware that transnational retailers are the actors who 
are responsible for production requirements, working and production times, and 
the required labor qualifications. These are viewed as existing conditions that need 
to be met by workers to keep their jobs. Similarly, unions have directed their claims 
consistently against local firms and brokers and the Brazilian government. This is 
a posture that reproduces traditional patterns of local unions’ action and does not 
question the global arrangements that characterize current agri-food production.
Third, the invisibility of transnational retailers is accompanied by the visible pres-
ence of brokers. In the fields, brokers make sure that certification conditions are met 
while payments for certification are provided by producers. Additionally, brokers 
are viewed as the actors that also establish the quantity of production as they negoti-
ate export contracts with producers. Production requirements are enforced by firm 
managers who instruct and control labor on the needed production tasks. Brokers 
can also count on the support of government authorities who express concerns for 
the consequences of the economic crisis but identify in enhanced competitiveness 
and specialized ‘niche’ production the desired anti-crisis moves. Producers and un-
ions have not been able to challenge brokers’ clout. Brokers’ power to affect the pro-
duction process rests largely on their quasi-monopoly of production information. 
They control information on the requirements, timing, and quantity of shipments. 
They further control information on available contracts and clients. They bring this 
knowledge to fruition as they set up contracts with producers and demand the re-
spect of certification requirements. Aided by the complexity of these requirements, 
the scope of commercial operations, and the virtually unchallenged manner in which 
these requirements are accepted, they emerged as dominant actors at the local level.
Finally, the case demonstrates that firm managers and producers employ certifica-
tion as a discourse to enhance their control and exploitation of labor. The discourse 
that dominates local labor relations centers on the argument that employment can 
be obtained and maintained only in the event that workers comply with certification 
requirements. In this context, certification is presented as an essential condition for 
the generation of employment, the establishment of viable anti-crisis strategies and 
access to markets.
In essence, the message that emerges from this study is that global networks of 
quality food production continue to be class based and firmly controlled by corpo-
rate actors. To paraphrase David Harvey, certification remains part of the restoration 
of class power associated with globalization. While claims about the emancipatory 
dimension of certification are made explicit, they remain just hopes that clash with 
the harsh reality of the conditions of workers in the fields.
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Notes
1. Collins’s work is important as she investigates fruit and vegetable production in the San Francisco 
Valley. Her analysis, however, precedes the development of TPCPs and does not focus on wage-labor. 
These are the primary foci of this article.
2. For an excellent summary of the debate on third-party certification see the special issue of the Journal 
of Rural Social Sciences, 25(3), 2010.
3. The analysis presented in this article refers to table grape production only. The producers and workers 
interviewed for this research worked primarily in table grape production.
4. These are key analytical categories that emerged from the grounded theory analysis employed in the 
study. There are a variety of additional categories that are also relevant such as gender (i.e. female 
workers are displaced in favor of male workers), immigration (i.e. immigrant laborers are controlled 
through political and bureaucratic processes) and community (i.e. local communities experiences a 
number of important changes). However, and for heuristic purposes, the article focuses exclusively on 
the above mentioned categories.
5. One US dollar is approximately 1.8 Brazilian reais. 
6. GLOBALG.A.P. requires ‘a responsible approach to worker health and safety’ and ‘responsibility re-
garding socially related issues’. While the use of labor must conform only to existing domestic legisla-
tion, the exploitation of labor is considered one of the primary conditions to be prevented. 
7. Check-list is the term used by GLOBALG.A.P. to refer to items to be included in the certification pro-
cess. The English word ‘check-list’ is used in the everyday Portuguese used by workers.
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